But even after the signing of the BDCA in 2013, there were several rounds of tensions within the LAC. In September 2014, there was an impasse between the forces of the two sides after Indian workers began building a canal in a border village in Ladakh. Diplomatic interventions quickly resolved the conflict and both forces withdrew. Similarly, a confrontation between the defense forces of the two countries took place in September 2015 after Chinese troops invaded a disputed area and erected a makeshift watchtower. The Doklam crisis in 2018 also saw prolonged stalemates between troops. Despite the provisions of the agreement, there have been patrols and clashes between the armed forces. Resolving these conflicts without major collateral damage is a victory for BDCA 2013. Given that China and India have not mutually agreed on an effective line of control (LAC), sporadic border crossing incidents appear to be increasingly becoming a covert Chinese strategy to assert their claims in India`s western sector, particularly in northeastern Ladakh and arunachal Pradesh in the eastern sector. The LAC is not physically delineated on the ground or on military maps, and there is a persistent reluctance and official refusal by China to show India its version of the LAC – suggesting a broader ploy to gradually build a dossier for its claims in eastern Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh.
BdCA is one of many defense cooperation agreements signed between countries around the world.  For example, Article II of the BDCA states that the two countries must exchange strategic information, but it does not specify what specifically constitutes „information on military exercises, aircraft, explosive operations and unmarked mines.” It is doubtful whether China is transparent enough to provide information about its military and cargo flights to the front runways near the borders. Article II also appears to be worded to provide the Chinese Air Force with cover to „locate aircraft that may have crossed the actual line of control or are in the process of crossing the actual line of control” in border areas – suggesting that China could increase deployment and ensure the possibility of an air offensive in those areas. Beijing celebrated September 23. In October 2013, he successfully negotiated the signing of a Border Defense Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) with India, which appears to be a Chinese conspiracy to undermine debate over its recent strategic offensive behavior. Although the agreement appears to have set a positive tone for future negotiations between New Delhi and Beijing, it does not lead to a significant change in Chinese policy. The last mechanism is a purely symbolic agreement that has not led to tangible progress on the ground. Article III explains the process by which the DAD is to be implemented through meetings between border personnel, military officers and other departments and groups. There is nothing new in these announcements; it has been around for many years. The main provision of the 2013 agreement is to put an end to patrols by both sides and thus eliminate cases of border conflicts. It is now possible to retrospectively evaluate the provisions of the agreement. Since the 1962 war, the two countries have concluded various bilateral agreements as confidence-building measures (CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES) to prevent an escalation of the situation, including the high-profile 1996 agreement and the „dominant practice” of not using weapons in the vicinity of lac resulting from this and other agreements.
Below we have described the various bilateral agreements and relevant governmental and international sources that can be consulted: Signed in New Delhi on 29 November 1996, available in the database of Chinese treaties on MFA in English, Chinese and Hindi. Copies and summaries in English of the agreement are also available in the United Nations Peacemakers Database and the University of Edinburgh`s PA-X Peace Agreement Database. According to the UN Peacemaker website, the agreement „allows for military disclosure when the parties conduct border exercises and the reduction of troop levels in border areas. It also allows parties to observe and inspect troop movements in their respective territories by invitation. In this agreement, both sides agreed to reduce or limit their forces in the mutually agreed geographical areas along the LAC. It defines the main categories of armament to be reduced or limited: „Battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, guns (including howitzers) of a caliber of 75 mm or more, mortars of a caliber of 120 mm or more, surface-to-surface missiles, surface-to-air missiles and any other jointly agreed weapons system.” (Art. 3.) It also stipulates that „both parties must open fire, cause biodegradation, use dangerous chemicals, carry out explosive actions or hunt with weapons or explosives within a radius of two kilometers from the line of effective control.” (Art. . . .